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Towards Better Management of Flood Losses: Flood Insurance in a Wetter
World

Michael K. McShane
Juita-Elena (Wie) Yusuf (Corresponding author, e-mail jyusuf@odu.edu)
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
(Forthcoming in Public Works Management and Policy)

Abstract
Flood is the most frequent and costly of U.S. natural disasters with losses expected to increase due
to climate change. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) mandates flood insurance
purchase for properties with federally-backed mortgages in the 100-year floodplain. We propose
that mandatory flood insurance purchase be extended to all property in the 500-year floodplain.
Following flood events, payments would be directly provided for more properties that suffer flood
loss, reducing federal disaster aid spending. The mandate could put more pressure on local
governments to increase their Community Rating System score, such as through infrastructure
investments and management practices that reduce flood risk. The expanded requirement would
not address the inaccuracies of maps used to price flood insurance (and used by local governments
to make long-term planning decisions) but may impact floodplain development by making more
explicit the costs and risks of building and living in high risk areas.
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Introduction
Among natural disasters, flooding is the most frequent and costly in the United States.
Climate change will increase the frequency and severity of flooding due to several factors
including more frequent and violent storms, extreme precipitation events, accelerating sea level
rise, and greater storm surge, resulting in increased flooding and subsequently flood losses. In this
Commentary, we focus on the role of flood insurance in mitigating flood-induced losses and in
encouraging investment in protective infrastructure that increases resilience and reduces
vulnerability. In 2017, the U.S. experienced three hurricanes, eight intense storms, and two
massive inland floods, resulting in the costliest year on record for U.S. weather and climate
disasters (Smith, 2018).
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) manages the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP), which is not just a post-loss risk financing program, but also provides
incentives for flood mitigation 1 at the individual and community levels (Fan & Davlasheridze,
2016; Kousky, 2017). Since being founded in 1968, the NFIP has employed multiple tactics to
increase the flood insurance participation rate 2, such as subsidizing premiums, providing generous
commissions to insurance companies and their agents to sell flood insurance, and requiring certain
high flood risk properties to purchase flood insurance. The policies in-force did steadily increase
until peaking in 2009 at 5.70 million (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018e), but then
decreased to 5.06 million policies in-force as of January 31, 2018 (National Flood Insurance
Program, 2018), an 11.2 percent decrease. The number of housing units in the US increased by
1

In the context of this Commentary, our focus is on flood mitigation, not climate mitigation.
Flood mitigation is defined as efforts “to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact
of disasters” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018f).
2
Participation rate (also referred to as penetration rate) means the percent of residences that have
purchased flood insurance in a specific area, such as a SFHA or a county.
2

more than 6 million from 2009 to 2017 (Statista, n.d.), which, coupled with the decrease in flood
insurance policies in-force, implies that the participation rate has decreased nationally over the
same period. Considering the increased frequency and severity of flooding, this suggests that fewer
households in high risk areas are protected by flood insurance.
A low flood insurance participation rate is a root cause of both the NFIP’s debt and its
ineffectiveness in managing flood losses and reducing federal flood disaster payments. Increased
participation could reduce the burden on taxpayers in several ways. Any payment by an NFIP
policy for flood losses directly reduces the amount of disaster assistance the policyholder can
receive. In addition, after a flood loss, an NFIP policyholder can receive funds to pay for mitigation
to reduce the severity of losses in future flood events. Increasing the number and risk diversity of
properties covered by the NFIP would create a more sustainable risk pool 3 that limits further NFIP
debt and reduces both the amount of federal disaster aid paid and non-covered losses borne by
flood victims.
The focus of this paper is on the flood insurance participation rate and making the case for
expanding the mandatory purchase requirement beyond the 100-year floodplain to include the 500year floodplain. Currently, the only property owners required to have flood insurance are those
with federally-backed mortgages in Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs), also known as the 100year floodplain, which are areas that have at least a one percent chance of flooding annually.
Properties in the 500-year floodplain have at least a 0.2 percent likelihood of flooding annually.
3

In insurance terminology, the risk pool, sometimes called the insurance pool, is the group of
policyholders that the insurer bundles together to reduce risk. The insurer estimates losses of the
entire pool to determine how much to charge policyholders. The insurance conception of risk is
similar to Knight’s (1921) distinction between risk and uncertainty. Risk is quantifiable to some
degree in terms of known outcomes and their likelihoods, whereas uncertainty is “not susceptible
to measurement.” Furthermore, while risk can be quantified and priced into insurance rates,
uncertainty cannot because the outcomes and the likelihoods of outcomes are unknown.
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We use the term “participation rate” in this Commentary interchangeably with other commonly
used terms such as “take up rate” and “penetration rate”.
We argue that such an expansion is an important step in stabilizing the NFIP, substituting
insurance for federal disaster aid payments, and improving flood loss recovery for property
owners. If the purchase of flood insurance is voluntary, the expectation of receiving disaster aid
can crowd out the demand for flood insurance (Browne & Hoyt, 2000; Kousky, Michel-Kerjan, &
Raschky, 2013; Lewis & Nickerson, 1989; Raschky, Schwarze, Schwindt, & Zahn, 2013; Raschky
& Weck-Hannemann, 2007). Even those who purchase flood insurance after a flood loss tend to
let coverage lapse after two to four years (Michel-Kerjan, Lemoyne de Forges, & Kunreuther,
2012).
In addition, expanding the purchase requirement to property in the 500-year floodplain
would provide more incentive for property owners to pressure their local government to participate
in the Community Rating System (CRS) and for those communities participating to try to increase
their CRS Class rating, which results in flood insurance discounts for the entire community. A
community’s CRS rating can be improved in various ways, including investments in infrastructure
improvements or infrastructure management and planning that reduce flood risk. An expanded
flood insurance purchase mandate could also alleviate problems caused by inaccurate Flood
Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs), which result in underestimating property risk and not purchasing
flood insurance. The current FIRMs appear to drastically underestimate the number of properties
that are in the 100-year flood zone (Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,
2017; Wing et al., 2018).
Federal flood insurance is available for properties in communities that have qualified for
participation in the NFIP. To qualify, the community must submit a floodplain management plan
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that at least meets the minimum NFIP requirements. Currently, about 22,000 U.S. communities
participate in the NFIP (Marsh LLC, 2015). An NFIP-qualified community can participate in the
CRS and work to improve its CRS Class rating to earn flood insurance premium discounts for its
residents. The CRS rating reflects the degree to which the community (i.e., the locality) has
undertaken floodplain and watershed management activities that exceed the minimum NFIP
requirements. Flood insurance premium discounts for residents range from 5 percent for a Class 9
rating to 45 percent for a Class 1 rating.
The CRS is the only program “designed to encourage communities to proactively reduce
their flood risks” (100 Resilient Cities, 2017, p. 5). However, the CRS is a voluntary program and
there are significant barriers to entry for many localities. Currently, about six percent of NFIP
communities participate in the CRS (Environmental Defense Fund, 2017) and only one community
has achieved the highest CRS Class 1 rating, receiving an average flood insurance premium
discount in the SFHA of $963 (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2017a).
CRS rewards localities for activities that reduce flood hazards while protecting the natural
and beneficial functions of flood-prone land (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015a).
The CRS rating can be increased by investing in infrastructure improvements that increase
resilience to flooding. For example, CRS rewards investments in preservation and restoration of
natural infrastructure (like wetlands and vegetated shorelines) and investment in green
infrastructure (such as bioswales, permeable pavements, cisterns, or stormwater planters) that offer
protection against damage from flooding and reduce flood losses (Environmental Protection
Agency, 2015). 4
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Highfield and Brody (2017)find that communities participating in the CRS experience more
than a 40% reduction in flood claims relative to communities that do not participate.
5

Green infrastructure uses natural features and processes, and engineered controls to reduce
runoff volume through infiltration, evapotranspiration, or rainwater harvesting (Environmental
Protection Agency, 2015).Green infrastructure involving open space, wetlands, floodplains, and
woodlands, and/or using such green infrastructure to support natural floodplain functions
contribute to higher CRS ratings. Preserving or restoring floodplains such as through natural
floodwater storage can also contribute to improved CRS ratings.
CRS also encourages infrastructure management that minimizes future flood damages such
as by preserving open space, protecting national floodplain functions, and regulating development
in the floodplain and in the watershed. Localities can improve their CRS rating by focusing on
planning and development functions that emphasize infrastructure-related decisions to reduce
flood losses in existing development. They may include improving drainage system maintenance
efforts, addressing repetitively-flooded properties, and adopting higher building code standards
and stormwater management regulation.
In the next section, we document recent flood losses in the U.S. and the related increase in
NFIP debt and disaster aid spending, followed by a section that describes the low flood insurance
participation rate with case studies of two recent flood disasters that illustrate the low participation
rate, amounts of flood insurance and disaster aid paid, and uncovered losses borne by homeowners.
The subsequent section describes decades of attempts by the NFIP to increase the participation
rate and argues for expanding the mandatory purchase requirement beyond the current high risk
zone. The final section discusses the benefits of expanding the mandatory flood insurance purchase
requirement. We conclude with a brief discussion of the policy landscape and how flood insurance
policy changes may come about to improve flood resilience in a world made wetter due to climate
change and sea level rise.
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Flood Losses in the U.S., NFIP, and Disaster Aid
Flood is the most frequent and costly among natural disasters in the U.S. From 2008 until
2017, 73 percent of FEMA disaster declarations were flood related (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2018a; Lightbody & Tompkins, 2018). The U.S. federal government is
exposed to flood losses mainly through federal disaster assistance and the NFIP. For example, in
the case of Hurricane Sandy in 2012, Congress appropriated $50 billion to be administered by 19
federal agencies for recovery efforts (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2015).
Additionally, the NFIP paid almost $8.3 billion in claims, increasing the NFIP deficit by about
$6.25 billion to a total $24 billion. The NFIP repaid $1 billion in principal in December 2014,
which was the first repayment of principal since 2010 (U.S. Government Accountability Office,
2015). The hurricane damaged about 650,000 homes resulting in 144,000 NFIP claims being
submitted, which indicates most homes did not have flood insurance and that tremendous losses
were borne by property owners (Government Accountability Office, 2015). The 2017 season
included Hurricane Harvey in August, which hit Houston; Hurricane Irma in September, which
swept across southern Florida; and Hurricane Maria a few days later, which resulted in the
devastation of Puerto Rico. These hurricanes and other major storms in 2017 increased NFIP debt
past borrowing limits, resulting in Congress forgiving $16 billion of the program’s debt and
allowing for additional NFIP borrowing to pay for flood losses, which increased NFIP debt beyond
$20 billion (100 Resilient Cities, 2017; Casey, 2017). Table 1 shows NFIP claims for major flood
events after Hurricane Sandy (through 2016).

Table 1. NFIP claims payments for major flood losses since Hurricane Sandy in 2012.
7

Flood Location
Illinois
Colorado
Florida
Texas
South Carolina
Midwest
Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas,
Mississippi
Texas
Louisiana
SE U.S. Coast (Hurricane Matthew)

Date
Apr 2013
Sep 2013
Apr 2014
May 2015
Oct 2015
Dec 2015
Mar 2016

NFIP Claim Payments
$89,543,129
$69,478,876
$111,314,399
$466,789,452
$138,680,941
$97,676,179
$282,577,207

Apr 2016
Aug 2016
Oct 2016

$468,472,097
$2,452,588,855
$162, 000,000

*Data as of November 30, 2017
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency (2018c), data for SE U.S. Coast (Hurricane Matthew) from “NFIP
Payouts to Matthew Victims Top $162M” (2016)

Federal flood recovery spending is not just a coastal occurrence. For the 2013 Colorado
floods, about $415 million was paid out in federal disaster aid and more than $68 million in NFIP
claims (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013). From 2008 to 2017, of the ten states that
suffered the most flood-related disaster declarations, eight were non-coastal states (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2018a; Lightbody & Tompkins, 2018). Furthermore, over the
last 40 years, property damage caused by flooding has increased approximately 54 times (Brody,
Highfield, & Kang, 2011).
Since Hurricane Sandy, historic or near historic wide-spread flood events have occurred in
Louisiana, West Virginia, Maryland, Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, Utah, New Jersey, Missouri,
Kansas, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Kentucky, Michigan, New York, Arizona, New York, Florida,
New Mexico, and Colorado (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018c; U.S. Geological
Survey, 2017). More recently Hurricane Matthew in 2016; Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in
2017; and four nor’easters in March 2018 have caused significant flood losses. With rising sea
level, increased potential for more intense hurricanes, and heavy precipitation events (both coastal
and inland), flood losses can be expected to increase over time (Melillo, Richmond, & Yohe,
8

2014), inflating losses for property owners and governments at all levels and increasing the
likelihood that taxpayers will end up footing the bill.
Federal funding for response and recovery comes from the Disaster Relief Fund managed
by FEMA and from disaster aid programs of other participating federal agencies. The federal
contribution to total loss payments has increased in recent years, from 23 percent for Hurricane
Hugo in 1989, to 50 percent for Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 69 percent for Hurricane Ike in 2008,
and more than 80 percent in 2012 for Hurricane Sandy (Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2013). This
trajectory of increasing federal disaster aid is not sustainable (Englander, 2013). We argue that
increasing the number of properties required to purchase flood insurance is preferable to disaster
aid for financing recovery after flood loss and also promotes more sustainable rebuilding.

Low Flood Insurance Participation Rates
This section documents low flood insurance participation rates and presents case studies of
the South Carolina flooding of October 2015 and Hurricane Harvey in August 2017, further
illustrating low participation rates and the relative amount of flood insurance claims and disaster
aid paid and losses borne by affected property owners.
Even with a variety of NFIP efforts since the program began in 1968, participation in NFIP
has remained low. The devastating Missouri and Mississippi River floods of 1993 revealed that
only about ten percent of flood damaged structures were covered by flood insurance (Kousky &
Kunreuther, 2010). The NFIP mandates flood insurance purchase for properties with federallybacked mortgages in SFHAs. For the 1998 floods in Vermont, only about 16 percent of damaged
properties had flood insurance even though insurance should have been mandatory for 45 percent
of the properties (Michel-Kerjan et al., 2012). The estimated participation rate for single-family
9

homes in the SFHAs of St. Louis County, Missouri in 2000 was about 15 percent (Kousky &
Kunreuther, 2010). An investigation of properties within 1,000 feet of the coast in seven hurricaneprone counties found that 49 percent have flood insurance (Kriesel & Landry, 2004). A national
2006 study by the Rand Corporation estimates that the participation rate is about 50 percent in
SFHAs and one percent outside SFHAs, and concludes that 20 to 25 percent of single family homes
that are subject to the mandatory purchase requirement do not have flood insurance (Dixon,
Clancy, Seabury, & Overton, 2006). In areas flooded by Hurricane Sandy in 2012, less than 20
percent of residential buildings in areas hit by Sandy had flood insurance (Michel-Kerjan et al.,
2015). Kousky (2017) uses county-level data for all Gulf and Atlantic coast states and calculates
average participation rate of three percent. 5 In Houston, the percent of property covered by flood
insurance dropped by nine percent in the five years preceding the historic Hurricane Harvey
flooding in August 2017 (Spencer & Hoyer, 2017).
The following discussion presents two case studies—the South Carolina floods of October
2015 and Hurricane Harvey of August 2017—to illustrate the low flood insurance participation
rates and the amount of NFIP flood claims and disaster aid paid out. The low participation rate of
flood insurance purchase in high risk residential markets indicate that few homeowners are
protecting their assets by purchasing flood insurance policies and subsequently need to rely on
disaster aid.

Case 1: October 2015 South Carolina Flooding
We focus on low flood insurance participation rates by investigating the case of the South
Carolina flooding that happened in early October 2015. Historic rainfall of more than 20 inches
Kousky (2017) calculates the participation or penetration rate as the “number of policies-in-force in a
given county divided by the total housing units in that county.”
5
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fell over much of the state in a four-day period leading to unprecedented flooding. An estimated
33,000 residences were inundated with at least 12 inches of water according to the South Carolina
Disaster Recovery Office (SCDRO, 2016). As a result of that flood, 36 out of 46 South Carolina
counties were declared eligible for federal assistance. Of the 36 counties, 23 were eligible for both
individual assistance (IA) and public assistance (PA), 12 for PA only, and one for IA only (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2015b). Individual assistance covers “disaster housing for
displaced individuals, grants for needs not covered by insurance, crisis counseling, and disasterrelated unemployment assistance” and public assistance provides resources to help “communities
absorb the costs of emergency measures such as removing debris and repairing or replacing
structures such as public buildings, roads, bridges, and utilities” (Balonon-Rosen, 2017).
As of September 30, 2015, South Carolina had 198,885 NFIP policies in force in the whole
state, reflecting only 4.10 percent of housing units in the state with flood insurance coverage.
Figure 1 shows NFIP policies as a percent of total housing units in the 24 counties declared eligible
for federal IA. The average percentage for these 24 counties was 5.76 percent. Nearly 91 percent
of NFIP policies were in the five coastal counties. The 20 non-coastal counties eligible for
individual disaster assistance had an average participation rate of only 1.36 percent. In particular,
many of the counties that sustained the most damage had very low percentages of NFIP policies
relative to housing units.
We focus on the 24 counties that were eligible for IA to compare the amount of housing
recovery funding provided by disaster assistance and flood insurance. According to the SCDRO
(2016), the total losses are estimated at almost $894 million, of which $721 million are housingrelated losses. SCDRO also reported that the Small Business Administration (SBA) provided 3,090
low interest home loans amounting to $76 million with an average loan of about $25,000, and the
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NFIP had allocated $132.4 million to 3,864 claimants with average payments of $34,261. After
accounting for insurance and various other types of assistance, such as SBA loans but not including
IA, the non-covered housing losses amount to $521 million (South Carolina Disaster Recovery
Office (SCDRO) of the South Carlina Department of Commerce, 2016). The very low percentages
of households with flood insurance in these 24 counties means that most of the flood victims are
uninsured for flood losses.
Figure 1. NFIP policies as a percent of total housing units in the 24 counties declared eligible
for federal Individual Assistance in the South Carolina floods, October 2015.

Cherokee

Oconee

Spartanburg
Pickens Greenville (0.19)
(0.59)
Union
Anderson

Abbeville

York

Chester

Lancaster

Chesterfield

Marlboro

Laurens

Greenw ood
(0.33)

Fairfield
(2.52)

New berry
(0.78)

Lee
(0.22)

Saluda
McCorm ick

Lexington
(1.11)

Edgefield

Darlington
(0.36)

Kershaw
(1.36)

Richland
(1.34)

Aiken

Marion
Florence (1.1)
(0.74)

Sum ter
(0.91)

Calhoun
(0.15)

Clarendon
(0.64)

Bam berg
(0.41)

Horry
(24.27)

William sburg
(0.62)
Georgetow n
(25.7)

Orangeburg
(0.47)
Barnw ell

Dillon

Dorchester
(5.84)

Berkeley
(7.47)

Allendale

No Designation (n=10)
Public Assistance (n=12)
Individual Assistance (n=1)
Individual & Public Assistance (n=23)

Ham pton

Jasper

Colleton
(10.83)

Charleston
(38.62)

Beaufort

Note: Percentages shown reflect the ratio of the number of total flood insurance policies in the county to the total
housing units in the county.
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Data sources: FEMA 2016 Policy Statistics provides flood insurance policy count by county
(http://bsa.nfipstat.fema.gov/reports/1011.htm#SCT)
Factfinder 2014 Selected Housing Characteristics provides housing unit count by county
(http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_14_5YR_DP04&src=pt)

As shown in Table 2, just over 101,560 people applied for IA in the 24 eligible counties
compared to only 3,864 who received flood insurance claim payments for the whole state. Since
most flood insurance policies are purchased for residences in SFHAs, the large number of IA
applications relative to flood insurance claims implies that a substantial percentage of the IA
claims were for residences outside SFHAs.
Of the non-covered $521 million in housing losses, IA allocated around $96.8 million to
22 of the 24 counties (South Carolina Disaster Recovery Office (SCDRO) of the South Carlina
Department of Commerce, 2016). Additionally, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development set aside funds for the other two IA counties: $23.5 million for Richland County
(plus an additional $20.0 million for the City of Columbia which is in Richland County) and $16.3
million for Lexington County. This totals to about $156 million for the 24 counties that qualified
for IA. Factoring in this funding leaves non-covered housing losses at an estimated $365 million
to be borne by homeowners and renters, which is about 50 percent of the estimated $721 million
of housing-related losses.

Table 2. Number of Individual Assistance (IA) Applicants in the 24 Eligible Counties after the
October 2015 Flooding
County in South
Carolina
Bamberg
Berkeley
Calhoun
Charleston

Number of Applicants
for Individual Assistance
510
5,635
874
9,929
13

Clarendon
Colleton
Darlington
Dorchester
Fairfield
Florence
Georgetown
Greenville
Greenwood
Horry
Kershaw
Lee
Lexington
Marion
Newberry
Orangeburg
Richland
Spartanburg
Sumter
Williamsburg
Total:

3,964
1,892
2,848
4,081
607
6,364
4,318
330
472
5,797
1,773
1,946
5,603
1,031
688
6,391
20,447
344
9,925
5,791
101,560

Data source: (South Carolina Disaster Recovery Office (SCDRO) of the South Carlina Department of Commerce,
2016)

Case 2: Hurricane Harvey in August 2017
We also use the case study of Hurricane Harvey, which caused significant flooding in
Texas in August 2017. According to National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
the 7 days of rainfall (ending August 31, 2017) during Hurricane Harvey saw 6.9 million residents
experiencing more than 30 inches of rain, 1.25 million experiencing more than 45 inches of rain,
and 11,000 residents receiving in excess of 50 inches of rain (NOAA National Centers for
Environmental Information, 2018). This historic rainfall generated more than 19 trillion gallons of
rainwater, accompanied by 140 mph winds (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2017b).
Hurricane Harvey was the most costly natural disaster of 2017, causing damages of $125 billion
14

(Mooney & Dennis, 2018) and losses of $85 billion (Tabuchi, 2018). Nearly 80,000 homes were
inundated by 18 inches of rainwater, more than 28 percent of which experienced more than 5 feet
of rainwater (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2017b).
According to FEMA data as of January 16, 2018, 41 counties were designated as eligible
for IA and 53 counties declared eligible for PA (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018d).
The volume of applications for disaster assistance was one of the highest in FEMA history (Federal
Emergency Management Agency, 2017b). Across the state of Texas, 91,000 flood insurance
claims were filed and an estimated $8 billion paid in NFIP advance payments and claims, along
with $3 billion in SBA loans (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018d).
According to FEMA (2017b), the Houston area (in Harris County) “experienced the largest
amount of rainwater ever recorded in the continental United States from a single storm (51.88
inches).” In Harris County alone, FEMA data as of January 12, 2018 (Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 2018b) show that the NFIP had paid more than $2.9 billion to 47,035 flood
insurance claimants. The SBA provided $1.2 billion in low-interested loans. 117,533 applications
for IA were submitted, with $717 million paid for housing and other expenses.
The data on NFIP claims, SBA loans, and individual assistance show only a portion of
flood losses from Hurricane Harvey are covered. It also illustrates that while flood insurance
claims cover some of the flood losses, there were more IA applications than there were NFIP
claims. Like for the South Carolina case, the greater number of IA applications than flood
insurance claims illustrates that the majority of residences with potential to flood are not buying
insurance. Whether willingly taking this risk or due to lack of knowledge, homeowners would
have been in a better position if they were mandated to purchase flood insurance.
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In August 2016, Harris County had 240,350 NFIP policies in force, for an overall flood
insurance participation rate of 15 percent and a 28 percent participation rate in high risk areas
(Insurance Information Institute, 2017). However, statistics show that before Hurricane Harvey
there was a significant drop in the number of flood insurance policies, likely the result of increases
in the annual premium costs due to Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Condon,
Donn, Hoyer, & Sweet, 2017). While Congress later repealed the 2012 flood insurance premium
hikes (in 2014), the repeal did not generate a substantive increase in insurance policy purchase. In
June 2017, there were nearly 250,000 policies in force in Harris County, compared to 275,000
policies in force at the end of 2012. The number of policies in the City of Houston fell from 133,000
to 119,000, consistent with the trend in Harris County and nationally.
Hurricane Harvey also highlighted an important problem with FIRMs – the maps do not
take into account flooding from under-capacity of drainage sewers and ditches, or from water
flowing toward a sewer or bayou. More than half of the flooding in Harris County over the years
has been due to such problems, according to the Harris County Flood Control Districts (Condon
et al., 2017).
A preferred participation rate measure for these cases would use total housing units within
the SFHA in the denominator instead of total housing units in the county. We did not have access
to the SFHA numbers for these cases. The cases do illustrate that the overall adoption numbers are
a cause for concern. The South Carolina case indicates the large number of people who applied for
Individual Assistance relative to those who received flood insurance claim payments. The
Hurricane Harvey case indicates the worrisome trend that the number of homeowners buying flood
insurance is decreasing in recent years, even in flood prone areas.

16

Attempts to Increase the Flood Insurance Participation Rate
A higher flood insurance participation rate would alleviate important issues described in
this Commentary. This section describes attempts made to increase the participation rate, leading
us to propose a mandate to expand the flood insurance risk pool in response to the failure of these
other methods.
Hurricane Betsy made landfall in Louisiana in 1965 to become the first U.S. storm to cause
losses in excess of $1 billion (Knowles & Kunreuther, 2014). Congress passed the Hurricane
Disaster Relief Act resulting in an unprecedented amount of federal aid flowing to the victims
(Michel-Kerjan, 2010). With private insurers unwilling to offer flood coverage, Congress created
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968 with a main goal of using the insurance
mechanism to provide post-loss financing to reduce federal spending on flood disaster aid
(Knowles & Kunreuther, 2014). To attain this goal, however, flood insurance participation needs
to be substantial.
Over the decades, FEMA has attempted to increase flood insurance participation rates in
various ways (American Institutes for Research, The Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation,
and Deloitte and Touche LLP, 2002; Kousky, 2017):
•

subsidizing flood insurance premiums

•

making flood insurance mandatory for structures in SFHAs with mortgages from federallybacked lending institutions

•

providing incentives for private insurance companies and agents to promote flood
insurance purchase

•

requiring flood insurance as a condition for receiving disaster aid in some cases

•

sponsoring media efforts to reduce the confusion of those who think their homeowners’
17

insurance covers flood loss
Flood insurance premiums were heavily subsidized with the goal of increasing
participation for years after the program began. Hurricane Camille in 1969 resulted in substantial
flood damage and brought attention to how few people had purchased flood insurance, as only two
communities were participating in NFIP at the time (Knowles & Kunreuther, 2014). For the 1972
Hurricane Agnes, less than one percent of insurable damages were covered by flood insurance
(Anderson, 1974). In Pennsylvania, the hardest hit state, some of the most flooded areas had no
NFIP policies and there were less than 700 policies in force in the entire state (Anderson, 1974).
To increase flood insurance purchases, flood insurance premiums were reduced in 1972 by
almost 40 percent, even though they were already below actuarially fair value (American Institutes
for Research, The Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, and Deloitte and Touche LLP,
2002). However, because insurance should send an appropriate risk-based pricing signal, the goal
of the NFIP since 1981 has been to gradually eliminate the subsidization of flood insurance
premiums. With subsidization being phased out, the NFIP focused on other methods to increase
the participation rate.
Congress passed the Flood Disaster Protection Act in 1973. The act mandated the purchase
of flood insurance for all properties with mortgages from federally-regulated lenders in SFHAs
(Knowles & Kunreuther, 2014). Even with this mandate, only about 60 percent of these properties
have flood insurance (American Institutes for Research, The Pacific Institute for Research and
Evaluation, and Deloitte and Touche LLP, 2002). Evidence suggests that even when they are
required to have flood insurance, some homeowners let their insurance policies lapse. Data from
NFIP show that between 2001 and 2009 the median NFIP policy tenure was between two and four
years, compared to the average seven years for residential tenure (Michel-Kerjan et al., 2012).
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Mortgage lenders can be fined for failing to require flood insurance purchase, but many do not,
either because they believe they are unlikely to be fined or because loans are typically sold off,
repackaged, securitized and fall between the cracks (Knowles & Kunreuther, 2014; Spencer &
Hoyer, 2017).
The NFIP also provides an incentive to motivate private insurers and their agents to market
flood insurance, with the main goal of increasing the participation rate. In 1981, the NFIP started
negotiating with the private flood insurance industry about its involvement with flood insurance.
This eventually became the Write Your Own (WYO) program after an agreement was reached in
1983 between the NFIP and private insurers who agreed to sell and service flood insurance policies
(American Institutes for Research, The Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, and Deloitte
and Touche LLP, 2002; Fier, Gatzlaff, & Pooser, 2014). The insurance companies receive a
commission on the sale of a flood insurance policy (to cover marketing and administrative costs,
and operating expenses) but play no risk-bearing role (Fier et al., 2014; King, 2005). However, the
participation rate increase was relatively modest in the ten years after the WYO program began.
The low participation rate may also be due to the expected flow of flood disaster aid, which
is explained by a type of moral hazard known as “charity hazard” (Browne & Hoyt, 2000; Kousky
et al., 2013; Raschky et al., 2013; Raschky & Weck-Hannemann, 2007). Homeowners may
rationally decide not to insure against natural disaster, such as flood, because they expect “free”
help will come, particularly in the form of disaster aid. Over the last few decades, large-scale
natural disasters followed by massive flows of federal disaster aid to damaged regions have
promulgated this expectation. Recognizing that the demand for flood insurance can be crowded
out by expected aid, the NFIP has made attempts to link the receiving of disaster aid to the purchase
of flood insurance. However, various studies find that enforcement and compliance is low
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(American Institutes for Research, The Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, and Deloitte
and Touche LLP, 2002). The political consequences of denying aid for certain individuals in a
region devastated by a natural disaster are likely to trump efficient enforcement (Healy &
Malhotra, 2009).
In addition, the U.S. participation rate for flood insurance is low because insurance
coverage is fragmented and confusing. Homeowners’ insurance, which does not include flood
coverage, is only available from private insurers and flood coverage is generally only available
from the NFIP. 6 After every major flood disaster, the media documents cases of property owners
who assumed that their homeowners’ insurance covered flood damage or that they cannot purchase
flood insurance unless their property is in a high flood risk zone (Feinman, 2013; Stempel, 2013).
Extensive public education campaigns do not appear to have alleviated this confusion to any
significant extent.
Even after decades attempts to increase the flood insurance participation rate, the number
of in-force policies decreased by 11.2 percent between January 1, 2009 and January 31, 2018
(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018e). Since incentives do not appear to be effective
in encouraging NFIP participation, we propose expanding the flood insurance purchase
requirement beyond the 100-year floodplain (with a one percent likelihood of annual flooding) to
the 500-year floodplain, which encompasses properties with a 0.2 percent likelihood of flooding
annually. This requirement would apply to all properties within the 500-year floodplain, not just
those with a federally-backed mortgage.
This proposal would be consistent with the changes introduced in 2015 in Executive Order

6

In a few states, private insurers also offer flood insurance separate from the NFIP, either in
addition to the NFIP or in place of it.
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(EO) 13690: Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard and a Process for Further
Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input. 7 EO 13690 established a Federal Flood Risk
Management Standard (FFRMS) that adopted a higher flood standard for future federal
investments affecting floodplains to allow for impacts of climate change. Flood elevations and
hazard areas under the FFRMS were required to be increased either to two or three feet in elevation
above the 100-year flood elevation or to the 500-year flood elevation. Although EO 13690 did not
require FEMA to incorporate the expanded floodplain delineation or elevated flood heights into
FIRMs, we argue that the South Carolina flooding and Hurricane Harvey case studies discussed
previously suggest that expanding the NFIP mandate to correspond with the FFRMS would reduce
federal disaster aid by requiring more properties to have flood insurance.
We recognize that expanding the flood insurance purchase mandate would face intense
opposition from those who perceive they have little or no flood risk. However, between 2010 and
2015, all fifty states experienced floods, and over 25 percent of NFIP claims and one-third of
disaster assistance funds were for properties outside mapped high-risk flood areas. Over 85 percent
of all Presidential Disaster Declarations (PDD) are for floods and 86 percent of all U.S. counties
experienced at least one PDD flood between 1990 and 2007 (Gallagher, 2014). From 2008 until
2017, about 73 percent of FEMA disaster declarations were flood related. From 2008 to 2017,
eight of the ten states that suffered the most flood-related disaster declarations were landlocked
states. In addition, a substantial amount of flood losses occur outside SFHAs. Looking at Hurricane
Harvey in August 2017, an estimated 60 percent of flood insurance claims in Houston and Harris

7

EO 13690 was revoked by President Donald Trump on August 15, 2017 by Executive Order
13807: Establishing Discipline and Accountability in the Environmental Review and Permitting
Process for Infrastructure.
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County were for properties outside SFHAs (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018a;
Lightbody & Tompkins, 2018; Staletovich, 2018).

Benefits of an Increased Participation Rate
This Commentary proposes to expand the NFIP flood insurance requirement beyond
properties with federally-backed mortgages in the 100-year floodplain to include all property in
the 500-year floodplain. This expansion will result in beneficial effects such as alleviating the
NFIP debt problem and reducing federal disaster aid payments and out-of-pocket losses by flood
victims. We also expect that expanded flood insurance requirements will generate pressure for
localities to participate in the Community Rating System (CRS) and make infrastructure
improvements and management decisions that increase flood resilience. While our proposed
expansion of the flood insurance purchase requirements is unlikely to correct the problem of
inaccurate or outdated FIRMs, it may impact development within the floodplain by making more
explicit the costs and risks of building and living in high risk areas.

NFIP Debt, Federal Disaster Aid, and Out-of-pocket Losses by Flood Victims
The NFIP was created to provide flood insurance in the U.S., which was not being offered
by the private market, with the understanding that communities would take proactive steps to guard
against future flood damage. The only property owners required to have flood insurance are in
SFHAs A national study by RAND found that only about one percent of homeowners outside
SFHAs purchase flood insurance (Dixon et al., 2006). The result is a risk pool with an
unsustainable proportion of high flood risk policies. This is analogous to a health insurance risk
pool with only older, less healthy policyholders. Insurance companies have always faced the
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adverse selection problem: individuals and entities with higher risk exposures tend to purchase
more insurance coverage. The goal of insurance underwriting is to overcome the adverse selection
problem by screening potential policyholders and creating a risk pool not dominated by higher risk
exposures. By design, the NFIP pool will be unbalanced because the only properties required to
purchase NFIP policies are in high risk areas. In effect, the current NFIP structure mandates
adverse selection.
Increasing the number and risk diversity of properties covered by the NFIP through an
expansion of the flood purchase requirement would create a more sustainable risk pool that limits
further NFIP debt and reduces both the amount of federal disaster aid paid and non-covered losses
borne by flood victims. Homeowners facing flood losses with no flood insurance are left in dire
straits. Even with the federal government paying out in disaster aid, entire communities can take
lengthy periods to recover. Another benefit of flood victims having coverage is Increased Cost of
Compliance, 8 which can pay for mitigation for the property that will reduce the severity of losses
in future flood events. With flood insurance required for more properties, more homeowners would
be incentivized by lower flood insurance premiums to pursue property improvements, such as
installation of flood vents, that reduce vulnerability and the severity of future flood losses.

Community Rating System (CRS)
Another benefit of making the flood insurance purchase mandatory for all properties in the
500-year floodplain is that it will incentivize more localities to participate in the CRS and for those

8

Properties covered by an NFIP policy that are damaged by flood may be required to reduce future
flood damage before repairing or rebuilding. Policyholders can get up to $30,000 in Increased Cost
of Compliance coverage to help pay costs to bring the property into compliance with their
community’s floodplain ordinance.
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already participating to improve their CRS Class rating. If more property owners are required to
purchase insurance, then more residents will pressure their local governments to improve the CRS
rating to reduce flood insurance premiums for the entire community. CRS ratings improvements
generally require investment by the city, and is a cost borne by the city that benefits property
owners in the form of lower flood insurance premiums, but does not directly benefit the city itself.
As such, pressure to improve CRS ratings needs to come from those who will benefit, since city
government mainly sees it as an expense (100 Resilient Cities, 2017).

Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs)
A major problem facing the NFIP is inaccurate FIRMs which are used to price flood
insurance. FIRMs are based on historical flood data and have become outdated in many
communities, as NFIP flood risk mapping has had a “history of haphazard technical updates”
(Knowles & Kunreuther, 2014, p. 344). As a result, FIRMs do not accurately represent current or
future flood risks (100 Resilient Cities, 2017; Hayat & Moore, 2015; Revkin, 2017). The BiggertWaters Act directed FEMA to improve mapping of flood risks, and by 2015 FEMA indicated that
94 percent of the country’s population lived in an area with an updated FIRMs, compared to 68
percent in 2008 (Government Accountability Office, 2016). 9 However, “not all updated maps
include modern, laser-generated data, which dramatically improve the quality of elevation and

9

Note that the impact of improved FIRMS on true flood risk is unknown, and this may be an
important area for future research. However, the expanded purchase requirement proposed in this
Commentary does not address the inaccuracies of maps used to price flood insurance (and in turn
used by local governments to make long-term planning decisions), but rather may impact
floodplain development by making more explicit the costs and risks of building and living in high
risk areas.
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topographic information that is crucial to estimating flood risk” (Congressional Budget Office,
2017, p. 27).
Furthermore, a 2017 report by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimates that
almost 60 percent of FIRMs inaccurately identify the level of flood risk (Department of Homeland
Security Office of Inspector General, 2017). Based on current FIRMs, about 13 million Americans
live in the 100-year floodplain. Applying new technology to investigate flood risk, Wing et al.
(2018) estimate that the actual number is 41 million, more than three times higher. In effect, FIRMs
are not sending accurate risk signals to millions of property owners who actually have significant
flood risk. Requiring flood insurance to be purchased for more properties will not improve the
accuracy of FIRMs, but will benefit owners who suffer flood loss and would not have had flood
insurance without the requirement. In addition, owners of a properties required to purchase flood
insurance will invest more in modifications that lower the flood risk for a specific property to
receive premium discounts for that specific property and push their local government to make
efforts to increase the CRS score, which reduces flood risk and premiums for the community.
At the local government level, expanded NFIP requirements would also better manage
development within the floodplain by making more explicit the costs and risks of building and
living in high risk areas. FIRMs have been used beyond their stated purpose of pricing flood
insurance, being used instead for making decisions with much longer-term consequences, such as
infrastructure investment and land-use decisions (100 Resilient Cities, 2017). When FIRMs are
outdated and inaccurate, decision makers (local government, developers, residents) have
inadequate information about their current and future exposure to risks, and as a result may make
under-informed decisions about where to allow development, where and how to build, or where to
buy property (Hayat & Moore, 2015). “[D]evelopers and individuals are using imperfect
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information to make choices about where to buy and develop. Many homeowners are not
adequately informed about the risk of flooding when making decisions about purchasing a home
or whether to carry flood insurance after their mortgages are paid off” (100 Resilient Cities, 2017,
p. 8). Furthermore, when such information remains skewed in favor of development in the
floodplain, the result has ripple effects in terms of where roads, cables and wires, pipelines and
other infrastructure need to be built (Revkin, 2017).

Getting to Policy Change
Increasing the NFIP mandate would involve substantial policy change, which will likely
require a tipping point, or a confluence of actors, options, and events that raise the saliency of the
NFIP issue beyond ‘business as usual.’ Such a tipping point can be driven by a focusing event,
for example, a large-scale disaster, that amplifies attention to a problem. If we think about the
policy situation using Kingdon’s (1995) multiple streams framework, the focusing event then
needs to be coupled with a policy window, which in turn requires an agreed-upon problem,
identifiable solution, and political climate that encourages action.
Flooding and its associated social and economic impacts can serve as focusing events, but
there is little evidence that recent floods have opened a policy window. The South Carolina
flooding and Hurricane Harvey have focused attention on the consequences of flooding, but this
visibility has not been associated with policy entrepreneurs, actors with the knowledge,
connections, political power, tenacity and even luck to be able to exploit windows of opportunity
for policy change and heightened levels of attention to specific problems to promote their policy
solutions (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996), who can connect the problem
with solutions and political capital. Creating and taking advantage of the policy window can be
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problematic because disaster relief, and not flood insurance, is the consistent issue raised after a
flooding event. The policy domain contains a loose community of actors who are involved only
episodically and are dominated by local and state interests and preferences for disaster relief writ
large, regardless of source (e.g., NFIP or disaster aid). The lack of an organized and coherent
advocacy coalition 10 means there are few voices to push for alternative pre-disaster solutions such
as increased reliance on flood insurance, and not simply the delivery of aid post-disaster.
Better management of flood losses requires a shift in post-disaster policy mobilization
away from disaster relief toward proactive flood loss mitigation, including improved insurance
programs and investment in protective infrastructure. This can be addressed by coalescing a
stronger advocacy coalition, which can include technical experts, floodplain managers, planning
organizations, emergency management professionals, and others. The coalition may draw
policymakers at all levels (local, state, federal) by capitalizing on existing concerns regarding the
ballooning cost of disaster aid and the size of the NFIP debt, in addition to playing to the concerns
or sympathies of policymakers who have had ‘bad experiences’ with federal flood disaster aid.
What is lacking, however, is a policy entrepreneur with the political capital to pull a coalition
together. One possibility may be a leading legislator from a recently flood ravaged state who steps
up and leads the charge, given the currency of the issue being experienced with the recent, widespread flooding. Floodplain managers, as a group of professionals and technical experts, could
also become policy entrepreneurs.

10

An advocacy coalition is a group of actors that interact with an element of constancy in a specific
policy domain, e.g. hurricanes or flood disasters. Members of the coalition often share the same
belief system and the common goal of changing policy or government action and/or bringing about
policy reform (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & Pelkey, 1987).
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Our proposal to increase flood insurance participation rate offers a possible policy solution
to address the problem of flood loss. Having strong policy solutions in advance of the focusing
event can help couple the tipping point and policy window, but solutions will need to be technically
and politically feasible. Academics and practitioners can work in tandem to address the technical
feasibility issue. Political feasibility may hinge on support from an advocacy coalition.
Previous experience with Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 and
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 has shown that even a fiercely partisan
Congress can act quickly in response to pressure from constituents. The recent historic and near
historic floods in many states, including Hurricanes Sandy, Irma and Harvey may create wider
concern about who bears the cost of flooding, but not sufficiently to generate the groundswell
needed for major policy change to the NFIP. Building a coherent, organized advocacy coalition
and testing the technical and political feasibility of different policy solutions will take time. The
next major flood event may serve as a focusing event—but a policy window can also be opened
by changes in political climate and context.
The NFIP was last reauthorized in 2012 when President Obama signed the Biggert-Waters
Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-141) into law. The NFIP was set to expire on
September 30, 2017 but Congress has since seen a series of short-term extensions (December 8,
2017; December 22, 2017; January 19, 2018; February 9, 2018; March 23, 2018; and July 31,
2018) to the program as it continues to consider potential changes as part of the reauthorization
process. As of the time of this article’s writing, the NFIP’s authorization was extended to
November 30, 2018. The uncertainty over NFIP reauthorization in the current political climate
may also offer an opportunity to couple a flood insurance policy solution with the problems of
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significant flood losses and the need for proactive investment in flood mitigation, which may open
a policy window.
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